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This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no
policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing plat-
forms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as
to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it
is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is
that the game ends in the ﬁrst period with the parties converging on what-
ever platform the incumbent chooses. If, however, there is a slight chance
of a small mistake, the incumbent does best in choosing a local equilibrium
platform. This suggests that local equilibrium policies can be the predicted
outcome even if the voting process is not myopic in any way.
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1 Introduction
When Anthony Downs in his classic book An economic theory of democracy (1957)
considered electoral competition he concluded that, in settings where no policy is
unbeatable, incumbent parties always lose elections. The reason for this is simple:
no matter what policy an incumbent advocates, there is always some other policy
which is majority preferred to it. If this policy is chosen by a challenger, he can be
sure to win the election. In Downs’ words:
The opposition need only [...] wait for the government to commit itself
[...]. Then it merely selects the policy that defeats whatever the govern-
ment has chosen, and - presto! - it is elected!1
But what if the incumbent government is allowed to react to the policy an-
nouncement of the opposition? Why would they then stick to their loosing policy?
After all, whatever the challenger has chosen, there is, by deﬁnition, always some
other policy which defeats that choice. If the incumbent government were to move
to this point, it would again be in a winning position. There may, of course, be
costs associated with such a change, but it must surely be better to move than to
passively wait to be defeated?
This paper studies a pre-election game with precisely these features. Two parties,
an incumbent and a challenger, choose policy platforms sequentially. They observe
each others’ announcements and whenever one of them has made a choice, the other
can respond either by altering his position or by keeping to his initial choice. If
either party chooses to stop, the policy platforms last chosen will be the positions
held by the parties in the election.
This modiﬁed version of Downsian electoral competition is very similar to the
Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game, with the important diﬀerence that the possible
outcomes are indivisible. Parties can either be positioned so as to represent a winning
policy, a loosing policy, or one where both parties have equal probability of winning
t h ee l e c t i o n . T h i sl e a d st ot h eg a m eh a v i n gm a n ys u b g a m ep e r f e c te q u i l i b r i u m
outcomes. However, after iterated elimination of weakly dominated actions, the
1Downs (1957), p.62. The underlying problem of voting in a setting without an unbeatable
policy was ﬁrst studied by Condorcet (1785) and later “rediscovered” and formalized by Black
(1948) and Arrow (1951), which led Downs to call this situation an “Arrow-problem”.3
game ends after the ﬁrst round with both parties advocating the platform initially
c h o s e nb yt h ei n c u m b e n ta n dw i t hb o t hp a r ties having an equal chance of winning
the election.
In terms of predicting an equilibrium policy, this suggests inertia. Any policy
which has been picked by the incumbent government, for whatever reason, is likely
to remain in place after the election. As such, it gives an answer to Gordon Tullock’s
(1981) question about why there seems to be such a contrast between the theoret-
ically predicted policy cycling and the observed stability in actual politics.2 The
reason suggested here is simply that “entering a cycle” is costly but never increases
ones chances of winning. In the absence of a Condorcet winner no matter which pol-
icy a party chooses, his opponent always has the same responses available: play so
as to win, so as to loose, or so as to having an equal chance of winning the election.
If no party accepts loosing, and continued play is costly, immediate convergence is
to be preferred.
However, the above reasoning does not single out any particular policy as being
more likely then the next. The incumbent can choose any initial policy, the opponent
still does best in choosing the same policy at once. This naturally raises the question:
is there a best initial choice for the incumbent and, if so, what characterizes such a
policy?
What is argued in this paper is that when taking the possibility of mistakes
into account, a local equilibrium policy turns out to be the best initial choice for
t h ei n c u m b e n t . T h i sc h o i c ei sb e s ts i n c ei tm a x i m i z e st h el i k e l i h o o do fw i n n i n g
the election if the opponent makes a mistake. This result relies on the following
interpretation of what it means to make a mistake in this kind of spatial game: If a
party is to choose a platform represented by a point on the real line, a tremble will
lead the party to choose a point close (in terms of distance) to the one aimed for.
To be very explicit, if a party attempts to pick a particular point between 0 and 1
2The large literature concerned with the question of stability inspite of the Condorcet paradox
is often grouped into three categories: probabilistic voting models, structure induced equilibrium
models, and agenda-setter models. See Persson and Tabellini (2000), pp 32-40 for an overview.
The rationale for stability suggested here is quite diﬀerent from these.4
as their platform, say the point 0.33, a tremble will lead them to accidentally choose
0.32 or 0.34 (or generally 0.33±ε). The idea is clearly related to reﬁnements such
as Selten’s (1975) perfect equilibrium and Myerson’s (1978) proper equilibrium, but
it is not the same. The spatial tremble suggested here implies that the likelihood
of the mistake is related to the distance from the point aimed for, and not to the
consequences when making the mistake, even though these are of course taken into
account when deciding on a strategy.3 The intuition for this spatial interpretation
of a tremble is that if the points on the line corresponds to actual policies, like a
tax rate in many applications, it is somewhat diﬃcult to see how an actual mistake,
when trying to pick 0.33, could result in accidentally picking, say 0.58.4 In contrast,
mistakes leading to 0.33±ε are relatively easy to envision.
That local equilibria emerge as the predicted outcome is interesting for at least
two reasons. Firstly, a local equilibrium exists under very general conditions when
the alternative set is one dimensional, as shown by Kramer and Klevorick (1974).5
Secondly, there are numerous examples of one dimensional political-economic prob-
lems where the existence of a global equilibrium can not be guaranteed in general.6
These have typically been dealt with by restricting the problem to cases where a
global equilibrium exists, (an exception is a recent paper by Crémer and Palfrey
(2002)). The main reason for this reluctance towards the local equilibrium concept
is that it has been considered unsatisfactory since it “required the voting process
to be myopic”. To quote Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980): “whether it provides a per-
suasive resolution to the “majority-voting paradox” depends on the extent to which
choices are limited to small perturbations of the existing situation”.7 This paper
3If, for example, a ﬁrst best strategy prescribes choosing 0.33, while the second best choice is
0.55 and the third best 0.29 in a game without mistakes, a proper equilibrium reﬁnement would
place the most weight on the second best choice and less on the third best. In contrast 0.29 is
more likely with a spatial tremble since it is closer. (Noting this diﬀerence may also be of some
general interest).
4It is important to note that what is considered here is the possibility of a mistake, not uncer-
tainty. The model developed is one of perfect information.
5As is well known, if the alternative set is multidimensional local equilibria exist only under
very extreame assumptions, as shown by Plott (1967).
6A classical example of such problems are those dealing with the public provision of private
goods, as noted by Musgarave (1956), Barzel (1973) and Stiglitz (1974), and more recently studied
in e.g. Epple and Romano (1996a), (1996b), and Fernandez and Rogerson (1995).
7Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), p. 307.5
shows that a local equilibrium is the predicted outcome in a reasonable extensive
form game without any such myopic restrictions.
Wuﬄe et al. (1989) study a situation very similar to the one considered in
this paper, namely the outcome of a two-candidate sequential competition in an
n-dimensional majority rule spatial voting game without a core. Their claim is
that in the absence of a Condorcet winning policy, an incumbent will locate at the
“Finagle point”. This position has the property that every point in the space is
defeated by some point very close to the Finagle point. This implies that no matter
what a challenger suggests, the incumbent does not have to change his policy by
much to counter the challenge. The main reason for advocating such a point lies
in the assumption that altering a policy is costly, and that this cost increases with
the spatial distance moved. Wuﬄe et al. do not, however, explicitly model the
game, leading to that some problems, such as motivating who will be the “last
mover”, remains.8 In contrast, this paper explicitly studies a formally speciﬁed pre-
election game. The fact that changing platforms is costly is modeled in the simplest
possible way, namely that both candidates have a cost for each round of continued
campaigning. As will be shown, this results in diﬀerent predictions.
Most of the literature which has modiﬁed and extended Rubinstein’s bargain-
ing game to a political setting has used it to study legislative bargaining situations
(such as Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron (1994) and Baron (1996)) with explicit
proposal, amendment and voting stages. Other studies that have taken a sequential
choice theoretic approach to electoral competition (following e.g. Kramer (1977))
have considered sequential elections. What is suggested here is much closer to Rubin-
stein’s original model and diﬀers from legislative bargaining games in that it studies
electoral competition between two candidates. In contrast to models of sequential
elections, the sequential game considered here takes place before an election.
8They have examples where they argue that locating at the Finagle point may be advantageous
both when the incumbent moves last, as well as when he does not. In the latter case, the argument
relies on the attractiveness of being positioned at the Finagle point in subsequent elections, even
though losing the “current one”.6
2T h e G a m e
Consider a situation where two parties, A and B,are to choose their policy platforms,
xA and xB, before an election. The set of alternatives is such that xi ∈ [0,1]. The
underlying preferences of the electorate are such that every policy, x, has a relation
to every other policy, x0, such that x Â x0, (x is majority preferred to x0), or x0 Â x,
(x0 is majority preferred to x), or x ∼ x0 (an equal share of the population supports
the respective policies or equivalently, everyone is indiﬀerent between x and x0). For
simplicity, I assume that only the same policy has this last property, i.e. x ∼ x0
only if x = x0. Furthermore, the situation is such that there is no unbeatable policy,
that is, for all x there exist x0 Â x, (i.e. there is no Condorcet winner). There is,
however, at least one local equilibrium policy, x∗, such that it is majority preferred
to any neighboring policy, with simpliﬁed notation, x∗ Â x∗ ±ε.9 The consequences
for the election outcome is obviously that if xA Â xB at the time of the election,
then A wins with certainty, if xA ≺ xB,Bwins with certainty, and if xA = xB, both
face an equal chance of winning. Parties are assumed to only care about winning
the election, (as implied by the fact that they are Downsian candidates), not about
the margin by which they win or about the policy implemented.
Before the election, candidates can alter their platforms any number of times.10
Party A, the incumbent, makes a ﬁrst choice, xA
0 . Party B, the challenger can now
choose a competing platform, xB
0 , w h i c hi ss u c ht h a te i t h e rxB
0 Â xA





0 . After observing this choice, party A can choose to alter his position or
“stop the game”. If A stops, the election is held with parties representing platforms
xA
0 and xB
0 respectively. If A moves, he picks a new platform xA
1 which is observed
by B, who then has the option of stopping or continuing one more period, etcetera.
Continuing the game has a cost for both players, (which can be thought of as a cost
of continued campaigning), captured by the outcomes being discounted by δ ∈ (0,1)
9More precisely, x∗ is a local equilibrium policy if there exist η>0 such that for all x such that
|x − x∗| <η ,x ∗ is majority preferred to x.
10O n em a yt h i n ko ft h i sa sc a p t u r i n gt h ef a c tt h a t“ t h e r ei sa l w a y ss o m et i m el e f tb e f o r et h e
election” and hence, no party can expect to have the last move. See e.g. Myerson (1991) for a




















(½,½) if xA= xB
(1 , 0) if xA> xB
(0 , 1) if xA< xB
Stop Stop
δ(½,½) if xA= xB
δ(1 , 0) if xA> xB
δ(0 , 1) if xA< xB
δ2(½,½) if xA= xB
δ2(1 , 0) if xA> xB
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(0 , 1) if xA< xB
Stop Stop
δ(½,½) if xA= xB
δ(1 , 0) if xA> xB
δ(0 , 1) if xA< xB
δ(½,½) if xA= xB
δ(1 , 0) if xA> xB
δ(0 , 1) if xA< xB
δ2(½,½) if xA= xB
δ2(1 , 0) if xA> xB
δ2(0 , 1) if xA< xB
δ2(½,½) if xA= xB
δ2(1 , 0) if xA> xB
δ2(0 , 1) if xA< xB
Figure 1: The pre-election game with alternating platform choices and no unbeatable
policy.
in each period, t ∈ {0,1,2,...}.
The situation is obviously analogous to a bargaining game with alternating oﬀers,
as in Rubinstein (1981). Figure I shows the structure of the game and the payoﬀs
from diﬀerent outcomes.
However, unlike the traditional alternating oﬀer game, the continuum of platform
choices does not correspond to a continuum of outcomes. After party A has made the
initial choice, only three responses in terms of relevant strategic choices are available
for party B :e i t h e rB chooses a platform which is majority preferred to A’s initial
policy, or a policy such that A’s initial policy is majority preferred to his choice, or
one where the population is split between the two parties. The situation is the same
whenever a player who is called upon to move chooses to continue the game. This
strategic simpliﬁc a t i o no ft h eg a m ei sp o s s i b l es i n c et h ec a n d i d a t e so n l yc a r ea b o u t
winning or losing, not by how much, and not about which policy is implemented.8
2.1 The equilibrium outcome without mistakes
Unlike Rubinstein’s game, which has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, this
game has many subgame perfect equilibria, due to the indivisibility of outcomes.
T h e r ei s ,h o w e v e r ,o n l yo n et y p eo fp l a yt h a ts u r v i v e sa ni t e r a t e de l i m i n a t i o no f
weakly dominated actions. This gives subgame perfect equilibria which predict that
t h eg a m ee n d si nt h eﬁrst period with both parties converging on the platform
initially chosen by party A, with both parties having an expected gain of 1
2.
Proposition 1 In the only subgame perfect equilibrium that survive the elimi-
nation of weakly dominated strategies, a player i, who has the choice of stopping or
continuing the game, stops whenever xi º xj and continues otherwise.
Proof. First, note that the game is stationary after the initial choices, that is,
the subgame starting in period 1, (3, 5, etc.) is identical to that starting in 2 (4,
6, etc.), with the players’ roles reversed. This means that party A faces the same
choices in every odd numbered period, while party B faces the same situation in
every even numbered period. Given this, the following is true for any subgame:
i) If given the option to stop when facing a certain win, this is always optimal
since no continuation of the game can give a higher payoﬀ (in any period t, the
value of winning with certainty is δ




ii) If given the option to stop when facing a certain loss, this is at least weakly
dominated, since no continuation of the game can give a lower payoﬀ than zero.
Hence, no strategy proﬁle involving stopping at a certain loss survives an iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
iii) Finally, faced with a ﬁfty percent chance of winning, stopping has an expected
value of δ
t/2 in any period t. All proﬁles involving continuing and accepting a loss in
the future are obviously worse since 0 <δ
t/2.T h eo u t c o m e1
2 in a future period t+s
is also worse, since δ
t+s/2 <δ
t/2. So only a proﬁle resulting in a certain future win
can be better than stopping at once (this would be the case whenever δ
t+s >δ
t/2).
However, no such proﬁles exist by ii), since the opponent never stops in t +1when9
facing a certain loss. Hence, it is always optimal to stop when facing a ﬁfty percent
chance of winning.
This implies that a player i, at any point t, chooses to stop when xi º xj, while i
always continues if xi ≺ xj. Consequently, a player j who “responds” to the platform
chosen by i, takes the position xj = xi, which is “accepted” by player i.
Even if there is no majority-rule equilibrium, in a social-choice theoretic sense,
this modiﬁed version of Downsian electoral competition, with alternating platform
choices, predicts the following equilibrium outcome:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium outcome of the pre-election game, where candi-
dates take turns in choosing their policy platform, is that both candidates immediately
converge on the policy suggested by the incumbent. Both candidates have an equal
chance of winning the election.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1.
In terms of predicting an outcome, this suggests that policies are likely to remain
unchanged. Whatever policy is initially picked by the incumbent will also be the
outcome of the game. Player A can choose any policy, xA
0 , in the initial round and
B will choose xB
0 = xA
0 , after which the game ends.11
2.2 The equilibrium outcome with spatial trembles
Even though the above, for a very simple reason, predicts policy stability and that
parties have equal chances of winning elections, as oppose to cycling and incumbents
always loosing, the prediction that any policy can be the outcome is clearly unap-
pealing. Surprisingly, introducing a small probability that parties make mistakes in
their platform choices narrows down the number of equilibrium outcomes to parties
converging on a local-equilibrium policy.
What does it mean to “make a mistake” when choosing a platform? The sug-
gestion here is that when deciding on a location in a policy space, a mistake should
11One can also note that there is nothing in the proof which is speciﬁc to a one-dimensional
setting. The prediction of immediate convergence can easily be extended to an n− dimensional
policy space.10
have a spatial interpretation. In a setting where similar policies are also close in
distance, it seems natural that a small mistake should lead to accidentally choosing
a platform close to the one aimed for. In terms of the analogy often used when
explaining “trembling-hand perfect equilibria”, a mistake can literally be described
as the result of a hand trembling slightly when trying to point out a position on a
line (or in space). The suggested equilibrium is, hence, a “spatial trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium”. With this interpretation of trembles, it turns out that a local
equilibrium policy has the property of maximizing the likelihood of winning in case
the opponent trembles, leading to it being a best initial choice for the incumbent.
To simplify the analysis we assume that the incumbent does not make a mistake
in his initial choice, which is also reasonable in this setting. Being the incumbent
means having ample time to position oneself before any challenger appears. It is
also assumed that mistakes only take the form of accidentally choosing neighboring
points to the one aimed for.12
In terms of the above game A, being the incumbent, chooses the initial platform,
xA
0 with certainty. However, when the challenger, B is to choose xB
0 , he may by
mistake play xB
0 ± ε, which happens with some positive probability p, (xB
0 + ε with
probability p/2 and xB
0 − ε with probability p/2). If A chooses to continue after
having observed B’s choice he no longer has the advantage of having had time to
position himself and may also tremble around his choice xA
1 , and may by mistake
play xA
1 ± ε, with probability p. Crucially, it is assumed that the probability of
mistakes is so small that it does not alter the optimal play given by Proposition 1,
that is when player i is called upon to move he stops whenever xi º xj and continues
otherwise. The assumption needed for this to be the case is that the expected value
of continuation is smaller than the expected value of immediate convergence, even
when one may make a mistake, i.e. EV(continue) <δ
t 1
2(1−p) ∀t. This is certainly
true for some positive p as p → 0.13
12This is also a simplyfying assumption. In general what is important is that it is more likely
that a mistake results in the choice of a point close in distance, rather than in the choice of a more
distant point. This, as well as the allowing for the possibility that the incumbent trembles, will be
discussed in the next section.
13Unlike the previous assumptions this is not a simplifying one but rather crusial. Without this11
Proposition 3: If there is a small positive probability that the challenger B
trembles in his initial choice of platform, then it is optimal for the incumbent A to
initially choose a local-equilibrium policy platform x∗. The global policy outcome will
be this local-equilibrium policy, and party A has a slightly better chance of winning
the election than party B.
Proof. First, note that the game is still a game of complete information and
that the optimal strategy given in Proposition 1 is valid, that is, whenever a player
i is to move or to stop, it is optimal to stop if xi º xj, while i always continues if




Consider ﬁrst any choice of initial policy, xA
0 , which is not a local equilibrium,
(that is xA
0 6= x∗). B’s best response is to choose the same policy xB
0 = xA
0 . If B
makes a mistake and instead chooses xB
0 = xA
0 ±ε with probability p, this will, with
probability p/2, lead to a situation where xB
0 ≺ xA
0 and A s t o p st h eg a m ef a c i n ga
certain win, but it can also, with equal probability p/2, l e a dt oas i t u a t i o nxB
0 Â xA
0 ,
where A continues the game. The expected value of choosing any policy xA
0 6= x∗
is EV(xA








2EV(continue),w h e r e
EV(continue) < 1 since the maximum possible continuation value is δ<1.
If A instead chooses the local equilibrium policy, any tremble from B will yield
a situation where xB
0 ≺ xA
0 since, by the deﬁnition of a local equilibrium, it is such
that x∗ Â x∗±ε. This implies that the expected value for party A from choosing the
local equilibrium is strictly greater than choosing any other initial platform, since
EV(xA










B’s best response is to choose xB
0 = xA
0 = x∗, which means that the game will
end after the initial choices since A’s optimal response is to stop if xB
0 = xA
0 = x∗
as well as if xB
0 = xA
0 ± ε = x∗ ± ε. This means that the game always ends with
the local equilibrium policy x∗ being implemented and A having a slightly higher
assumption the optimal play would be determined by a combination of the likelihood of mistakes
and the consequences of a mistake. Assume for example that a player would like to converge (this
has the highest payoﬀ in the absence of mistakes) but faces a situation where, if he makes a mistake,
he looses with certainty. He may then prefer to play in a way which leads to a continuation of the
game if the probability of a mistake is large enough. This would change the whole premises of the
game.12
possibility of winning.
By the same logic as for propositions one and two, the prediction is still that the
candidates immediately converge to the same policy. However, having the advantage
of moving ﬁrst, the incumbent chooses a locally “unbeatable” point and positions
himself so that any mistake from the challenger leads to a situation which is favorable
to the incumbent.
3 Discussion
The analysis in the previous section broadly suggest two things about two party
competition in a setting where no policy platform is unbeatable.
The ﬁrst is that, even if the possibility of cycling over policies exist in terms of
the underlying preferences of the voters, whether “the cycle is played” by the par-
ties depends on the costs and consequences of such play. In particular, if changing
platforms is costly, without leading to an increased probability of winning a subse-
quent election, parties do best in not engaging in such costly cycling behavior. The
consequence of this is that the opposition does best in trying to mimic whatever
policy platform the incumbent party advocates. This would also suggest that an
incumbent party can move the policy anywhere if it does so well before the election,
the opposition still does best in copying their platform in the pre-election phase.
Second, if the incumbent can position himself at any policy before an election,
knowing that the opposition will try to copy his platform, he does best in locating at
a point which is a local equilibrium, since any mistakes on behalf of the opposition
will lead to the incumbent winning the election.
T h e r ea r ean u m b e ro fw a y si nw h i c ht h ea n a l y s i sc o u l db ee x t e n d e dw i t h o u t
changing these results.
First, the local equilibrium prediction does not hinge on the incumbent not
making mistakes. Even if there is a small possibility that the incumbent makes a
mistake when announcing his ﬁrst choice, he still does best in aiming for a local13
equilibrium policy. To see this, consider a game-tree with both players trembling to
either side of the point they aim for with probability
p
2, and recall that each player
always tries to mimic the platform of the previous one. If the incumbent aims for
a point which is a local equilibrium there are ﬁve ways in which the game can still
e n di nt h eﬁrst period: Either both parties manage not to make a mistake in which
case the expected outcome is (1
2,1
2), or A m i s s e st h ep o i n th ea i m e df o r( t ot h er i g h t
or to the left) but B does not, also leading to the outcome (1
2,1
2), or A does not
miss but B misses (to the right or to the left), in which case both mistakes lead to
A winning since the initial choice was a local equilibrium. Now the diﬀerence if A
was to choose a point which is not a local equilibrium is, analogous to the proof of
Proposition 3, that if A manages not to make a mistake but B misses, only one of
these outcomes leads to A winning while the other leads to continued play, which
is obviously worse since no continuation is preferred to winning at once. (In both
cases there is, of course, also the possibility that both parties make mistakes in their
implementation. The outcome of such continuations are speciﬁc to each setting
and can not be compared in general, and are therefore assumed equal in the above
comparison. Even though very unlikely, parties could in principle keep missing what
they aim for, with the consequence that policy moves far from the initial point).
A second observation is that even if a player is allowed to revise a choice which
accidentally resulted in a mistake, this does not change the predictions about policy
outcomes, it only increases the probability of both parties ending up with the same
platform.
Third, with the simplifying assumption that trembles are restricted to points
close to the one aimed for, there is no diﬀerence between diﬀerent local equilibrium
points, all are equally “resistant to trembles”. In particular, in a setting where there
is a local, as well as a global equilibrium policy, both would be equally attractive
initial choices. This would, however, not be the case if it is possible to tremble over
the whole policy space. In general, assuming that the probability of mistakes is such
that points close by are more likely than those further away, but all points can be14
chosen with positive probability. Then a global equilibrium platform - if one exist -
is preferable since no continuation can lead to its’ defeat while a local equilibrium
does not have this feature.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has suggested a new way of pinning down the outcome of a classical
Downsian two-candidate competition without a Condorcet winner. In contrast to
“the continual defeat of incumbents” suggested by Downs (1957), and the “per-
petual change of platforms” in the absence of an unbeatable policy, the suggested
interpretation has been the following. Knowing that no party can ever ﬁnd an un-
beatable position, the candidates may as well converge to the same platform at
once, since continually changing platforms (to be in a winning position) is costly
and the probability of winning can never exceed one half anyway. It has been shown
that such reasoning is indeed an equilibrium outcome in an “alternating-platform”
pre-election game.
While this result predicts direct convergence to the policy chosen by the incum-
bent, it says nothing about which policy will be chosen initially. The “reﬁnement”
suggested here is that a local-equilibrium platform is stable in a speciﬁc sense. A
local equilibrium platform beats any neighboring policy and is therefore an opti-
mal initial choice for the incumbent party, whenever there is a small probability
that the challenger makes a (spatial) mistake when trying to mimic the incumbent’s
platform. The prediction is therefore that the outcome will be a local equilibrium
policy, even though the candidates are farsighted and can choose their platforms
without any restrictions. As such, this paper presents a defense of the local major-
ity rule equilibrium-concept, ﬁrst suggested by Kramer and Klevorick (1974), and
shows that the assertion by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) that “whether it provides
a persuasive resolution to the “majority-voting paradox” depends on the extent to
which choices are limited to small perturbations of the existing situation” need not
be true.15
The motivation for many of the papers following Downs (1957) has been the
sharp contrast between the disequilibrium results in the models, and the relative
inertia in actual politics. As Tullock (1981) phrased it, “Why so much stability?”.
This paper predicts policy stability in that candidates immediately converge to the
same platform. The very absence of a Condorcet winning policy makes any attempt
from a candidate to win pointless, since any position can always be beaten. Entering
a “cycle” is costly but does not increase the chances of winning. The paper also
predicts a slight advantage for the incumbent, since he can choose to position himself
so as to win every time the challenger makes a mistake in his implementation. These
two predictions are consistent with two real-world observations, namely stability of
policy and the electoral advantage of incumbents.16
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